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  This paper presents a bioeconomic model of a commercial fishery facing biological invasion 
by an alien species acting as a space competitor for the native species. The model is illustrated 
in a case study of the common scallop fishery of the Bay of St-Brieuc (France), where biologi-
cal invasion by a slipper-limpet (Crepidula fornicata) is now addressed by a control program. 
First we present the model, which combines the dynamics of the two competing stocks. We 
then use the model to analyze the equilibrium of the fishery under various assumptions 
concerning invasive species control, and to assess the social cost of the invasion. Finally we 
propose a set of dynamic simulations concerning the ongoing program, emphasizing the influ-
ence of its starting date on its overall economic results. 
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According to Article 8(h) of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (1992), invasive alien species 
are exotic species that are introduced, establish, and 
spread in an ecosystem, causing environmental and 
economic harm by threatening habitats and native 
species. Invasive alien species may impose 
significant losses in terms of foregone output, 
biodiversity loss, and reduced ecological services. 
  In order to estimate the loss of welfare due to 
invasion, it is necessary to link a model of the un-
derlying ecological relationships with an eco-
nomic model (Perrings, Williamson, and Dalmaz-
zone 2000). This implies representing the dy-
namics of the invasion and its various interactions 
with valuable species, ecosystem services, and 
biodiversity loss. Knowler and Barbier (2000) 
focus their analysis on the economic impact of an 
invader competing with a valuable resident spe-
cies. They present a general model describing the 
dynamics of this species subject to interspecific 
competition and environmental changes caused 
by the invasive species, and they measure the 
economic impact of the invasion as the difference 
between the steady-state returns of the harvesting 
industry in the ex-ante and ex-post situations. 
Their theoretical analysis is followed by an em-
pirical case study dedicated to the economic im-
pact of the comb-jelly Mnemiopsis leidyi on the 
Black Sea anchovy fishery. 
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  This paper studies the economic impact of the 
invasion of a commercial fishery by an exotic 
shellfish acting as a space competitor for the tar-
geted native species. The case study is located in 
the Bay of St-Brieuc, a 800 km
2 bay on the 
northern coast of Brittany (France). The targeted 
native species is the common scallop (Pecten 
maximus), and the invasive species is a slipper-
limpet (Crepidula fornicata). Originating from 
North America, this species was accidentally im-
ported some decades ago and has gradually set-
tled in many French coastal waters (Blanchard 
1995). Devoid of commercial value, it mainly 
acts as a space competitor for common scallop, a 
highly valued commercial species in France. By 
reducing the size of areas that are suitable for 
scallop beds (Chauvaud 1998), the spread of slip-
per-limpets threatens the long-run viability of 
several scallop fisheries. Among them is the 
scallop fishery of the Bay of St-Brieuc, the sec-
ond largest common scallop fishery in France. 
This fishery is seasonally operated by some 250 
artisanal boats subject to a limited entry license 
system (Fifas, Guyader, and Boucher 2003). 
During the 2001/2002 scalloping campaign, these 
boats landed 5,529 tons of common scallop, rep-
resenting an ex-vessel value of €11.8 million 
(Anon. 2002). The presence of slipper-limpets in 
the bay was first noticed in 1974 (Dupouy and 
Latrouite 1979); twenty years later, the stock of 
slipper-limpets was estimated to be 250,000 tons 
(Hamon and Blanchard 1994). This invasive 
process led to the establishment of a control pro-
gram, based on yearly dredging campaigns 
(Anon. 2005). 
  After an empirical economic study dedicated to 
the case of the Bay of Brest (Frésard and Bon-
coeur 2004), we present here a bioeconomic 
model based on the case of the Bay of St-Brieuc. 
Following Knowler and Barbier (2000), this model 
describes the impact of an invasive alien species 
on the profit generated by harvesting a valuable 
resident species in a bounded ecosystem. In our 
model, the negative impact of the invasive alien 
species relies on space competition with the 
native species. To represent the combined dy-
namics of the invasive and native stocks, we use a 
competing species bioeconomic model derived 
from Flaaten (1991).
1 This model allows com-
                                                                                    
1 The differences between our model and Flaaten’s (1991) model are 
the following: in our model, (i) the competition between the two stocks 
is asymmetric, (ii) the competition affects the ecosystem’s carrying 
capacity for the native stock, and (iii) the elasticity of CPUE (catch per 
unit of effort) to stock abundance may differ from one. 
parisons between pre- and post-invasion steady-
states (under various assumptions concerning the 
control policy), and is also suitable for dynamic 
simulations. 
  The paper is organized in three sections. The 
first section is devoted to a general presentation 
of the model. In the second and third sections, the 
model is used for different types of analysis. In a 
comparative static perspective, the second section 
analyzes the equilibrium of the fishery as a func-
tion of the level of invasive species control, and 
assesses the economic impact of the invasion ac-
cording to Knowler and Barbier’s (2000) defini-
tion. In the third section, dynamic scenarios of the 
evolution of the fishery are explored with the help 
of the model. The simulations are based on the 
invasive species control program which is ongo-







 We consider a fishery that is affected by the 
proliferation of an invasive alien species. This 
proliferation is the only environmental pertur-
bation affecting the fishery. 
 Only the consequences of the proliferation of 
the invasive species on the stock of native spe-
cies are considered. In the case of the Bay of 
St-Brieuc, other possible impacts of invasion 
by slipper-limpets, such as biodiversity reduc-
tion, have not yet been ascertained (Hamon et 
al. 2002). 
 The invasive species acts as a space competitor 
for the native species.
2 This competition is 
asymmetric: while the occupation of space by 
slipper-limpets makes it increasingly difficult 
for scallop juveniles to settle down, the pres-
ence of scallops does not hinder the develop-
ment of slipper-limpets, which can stick to 
scallop shells and develop colonies on these 
shells (Hamon et al. 2002, Chauvaud et al. 
2003). It is assumed that uncontrolled growth 
of the invasive stock leads to eradication of the 
native stock. All areas in the bay are potentially 
                                                                                    
2 Trophic competition between slipper-limpets and scallops, if any, is 
considered to be a minor phenomenon compared with competition for 
space (Chauvaud et al. 2003). 80    April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
subject to colonization by slipper-limpets, and 
once the density of slipper-limpets is high 
enough in a given place, it becomes impossible 
to harvest any scallop in this place. 
 A deterministic logistic model is used to repre-
sent the natural dynamics of native and inva-
sive stocks. This model has already been ap-
plied to the scallop stock of the Bay of St-
Brieuc (Mahé and Ropars 2001). Its capacity to 
predict short-run changes in the stock biomass 
is limited, since it does not capture the high 
variability of scallop recruitment under the in-
fluence of fluctuating hydroclimatic conditions 
(Boucher and Dao 1989). However, this draw-
back becomes less important when analyzing 
the long run.
3 As regards the invasive stock, the 
logistic assumption is merely a conjecture, 
since, up to now, only one assessment of the 
slipper-limpet stock has been carried out in the 
Bay of St-Brieuc (Hamon and Blanchard 1994). 
 It is assumed that the invasive process is spa-
tially homogenous, i.e., that the density of the 
invasive species grows at a uniform rate in all 
parts of the bay. This is clearly an oversimplifi-
cation, since the spatial development of slipper-
limpets is reported to be patchy (Hamon et al. 
2002). Taking this feature into account would 
necessitate a spatially explicit model, distin-
guishing various areas in the bay according to 
their degree of invasion. However, in the case 
under survey, this invasion takes the form of 
new spots appearing in various places of the 
bay, rather than a continuous increase in the 
size of an initially invaded spot (Hamon et al. 
2002). As a result, controlling the invasion 
cannot be thought of as defending a “frontline” 
between a pristine and a fully invaded area, 
which makes the simplifying assumption of 
space homogeneity more acceptable. In our 
model, the impact of invasion takes the form of 
a negative relationship between the invasive 
                                                                                    
3 The stability of hydroclimatic conditions cannot be taken for 
granted in the long run. However, in the case of common scallop, “long 
run” does not necessarily mean many years, since recruitment normally 
occurs at age 2, and most scallops are harvested at age 2 or 3 (Boucher 
and Dao 1989, Fifas, Guyader, and Boucher 2003). 
stock biomass and the carrying capacity of the 
ecosystem for the native stock. 
 For each stock, a constant elasticity of catch per 
unit of effort (CPUE) to stock abundance is as-
sumed. In the case of the native stock, available 
data (Table 1) do not provide any evidence that 
this elasticity is significantly different from 
one, which supports the standard assumption of 
proportionality between CPUE and biomass. In 
the case of the invasive stock, it is suspected 
that the elasticity of CPUE to stock abundance 
is greater than one. In other words, if one tries 
to fish down this stock, CPUE might well de-
crease at a faster rate than biomass. This con-
jecture, which corresponds to the case that Hil-
born and Walters (1992) named “hyperdeple-
tion,” could explain the irreversibility of the in-
vasive process. In the model, both “proportion-
ality” and “hyperdepletion” hypotheses will be 
considered for the harvest of the invasive stock. 
 Unit prices and costs are exogenous. In the case 
of common scallop, this simplifying assump-
tion is open to criticism, since available data 
suggest a connection between landings and ex-





For each stock, the time variation of biomass X is 
equal to the difference between its natural varia-
tion N and fishing mortality Y: 
 
(1)  / ii i dX dt N Y = −  ( i = 1,2), 
 
where subscript 1 refers to the native stock and 2 
refers to the invasive stock. The natural growth of 












 ( i = 1,2), 
                                                                                    
4 However, the interpretation of the decrease in the ex-vessel price of 
scallops in the first part of the 1990s is not straightforward, since the 
growing abundance of scallops during this period was observed in all 
major French scallop fisheries, and not only in the Bay of St-Brieuc. 
Moreover, industrial processing of scallops harvested in the Bay of St-
Brieuc area has developed in the second part of the last decade (Anon. 
2002), which might increase the dependence of the Bay of St-Brieuc 
ex-vessel price on the world market price of frozen pectinids. Frésard and Boncoeur  Controlling the Biological Invasion of a Commercial Fishery by a Space Competitor   81 
 
 
Table 1. The Bay of St-Brieuc Common Scallop Fishery: Resource and Activity  









(hours)  Nominal Real
a 
1990–1991   3,220   1,670    293   7,102  2.89    3.62 
1991–1992   4,650   3,320    279   5,690  1.88    2.28 
1992–1993   6,770   4,700    266   8,321  1.59    1.89 
1993–1994    10,080   5,300    261  5,686  1.61    1.88 
1994–1995    10,850   5,530    260  6,921  1.69    1.94 
1995–1996   9,430   4,550    260   6,038  1.82    2.05 
1996–1997   7,390   3,730    260   8,345  1.87    2.07 
1997–1998   8,560   3,710    254   8,949  1.87    2.05 
1998–1999   6,710   2,830    251   7,636  2.04    2.23 
1999–2000   5,780   2,710    244   7,609  2.12    2.28 
2000–2001   9,900   3,570    241   9,357  2.35    2.49 
2001–2002   7,990   5,600    243   8,358  2.13    2.22 
2002–2003    16,260    6,200      
2003–2004    15,720    6,510      
a In constant 2003 euros (using as a deflator the general consumption price index). 
Sources: Fifas, Guyader, and Boucher (2003) and Fifas (2004) for harvestable biomass and landings, INSEE for price deflator, 
and Anon. (2002) for other data. 
 
where ri is the intrinsic growth rate of stock i, and 
Ki is the carrying capacity of the ecosystem for 
stock i.
5 For each stock, the relationship between 









α =    ( i = 1,2), 
 
where qi and αi are positive parameters, and Ei is 
the fishing effort devoted to the harvest of stock 
i.
6 The following relationship describes the asym-
                                                                                    
5 A more general version of this natural growth model, where 
 
  N  =  rX (1 – (X / K)
θ ), 
 
has been recently tested on 1,780 biological populations (Sibly et al. 
2005). It appeared that a majority of these populations were charac-
terized by θ < 1. This result suggests that density-dependent effects 
tend to manifest themselves in early life stages, and that populations 
above their carrying capacity are slow to decline, while populations 
that are below their carrying capacity are quick to increase. 
6 Parameter αi represents the elasticity of CPUE to biomass of stock i. 
If its value is set to 1, CPUE is proportional to stock abundance, and 
the submodel describing the dynamics of the corresponding harvested 
stock (given its carrying capacity) is the classical Schaefer model 
(Schaefer 1954, 1957). The case where αi > 1 corresponds to hyperde-
pletion. 














 ( X2≤ K2), 
 
where K1max is the virgin (pre-invasion) carrying 
capacity of the ecosystem for the native stock. 
Finally, for each harvesting activity, we write profit 
(πi) as the difference between revenue and cost: 
(5)  ii ii i PY C E π =−    (i = 1,2), 
where Pi is the ex-vessel unit price of catch of 
species i, and Ci is the unit cost of effort devoted 
to harvesting stock i. 
Numerical Illustration 
Available data are too scarce for an econometric 
validation of the model. What is proposed here is 
only a numerical illustration, where the model pa-
rameters are given “reasonable” values, whenever 
information is available. 
 
  Common scallop (native species). The common 
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at the beginning of each fishing campaign by the 
French marine research institute, Ifremer. Concern-
ing biomass and catch, data covering fishing 
campaigns from 1990–1991 to 2001–2002 have 
been published by Fifas, Guyader, and Boucher 
(2003) [updated by Fifas (2004) for 2002–2003 
and 2003–2004]. These data are reproduced in 
Table 1. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), we 




11 1 tt t t Ya Xb Xu =++ . 
 
The results are 
 
a = 0.649  b  = -1.596 × 10
-5  R
2  = 0.74 
     (9.36)      (-2.82) 
 
(T-values are shown in parentheses). Variables X1t 
and X1t
2 are statistically significant with a 95 per-
cent probability. Requirements of normal distri-
bution of residuals (85 percent probability), non-
autocorrelation, homoskedasticity, and time-sta-
bility are satisfied. Assuming equilibrium and 
making use of equations (1) and (2), we may then 
identify r1 with a, and (-r1 / K1) with b. As a re-
sult, we get 
 
r1  = 0.649  and  K1  = 40,689 tons.
7 
 
  These estimations are open to criticism for sev-
eral reasons. First, due to the multicolinearity 
between variables X1t and X1t
2 (Farrar-Glauber 
test), the estimated variance of coefficients is in-
efficient, and, consequently, the significance of 
the variables may be highly dependent on the 
sample. Furthermore, a bias is due to the fact that 
the estimation of K1 involves a non-linear trans-
formation of estimated coefficients. Another con-
cern is the fact that the equilibrium assumption is 
at odds with important variations in biomass and 
landings during the observation period (see Table 
1). It is worth recalling that the model neglects 
the strong influence exerted by hydroclimatic 
conditions on the recruitment of scallops. While 
catch and biomass have experienced parallel 
                                                                                    
7 Applying the same model to the same stock, Mahé and Ropars 
(2001) propose the following estimations: 0.535 for r1 and 30,398 for 
K1. The t-statistics are respectively 3.01 and 2.6, and R
2 is equal to 0.4. 
But the covered period and the number of observations are not 
specified. 
changes during the survey period, fishing effort 
has been much more stable, which suggests that 
the major part of the changes in biomass and 
catch during this period is due to hydroclimatic 
fluctuations that are not taken into account by the 
model. For these reasons, the values of parame-
ters r1 and K1 used in the numeric simulations of 
this paper should be regarded as illustrative, 
rather than as the results of a genuine calibration.
8 
  The carrying capacity for scallops in the Bay of 
St-Brieuc during the 1990s was adversely af-
fected by the level of slipper-limpet biomass. As-
suming that this biomass represented 25 percent 
of the bay’s carrying capacity for slipper-limpet 
at that time (see below) and combining this as-
sumption with the estimated value of K1, we may 
derive from (4) the estimated pristine (pre-inva-
sion) carrying capacity for scallops: 
 
   K 1max  =  54,252 tons. 
 
  The remark concerning the illustrative charac-
ter of the growth function parameters also applies 
to the parameters of the catch function (3). Mak-
ing use of data presented in Table 1, we first es-
timate the following double log transformation of 
equation (3): 
 
(7)  11 1 ln ln tt t Z cX v = +α + , 
 
where Z1t is the CPUE at year t, and c is the ne-
perian logarithm of q1. The results are 
 
c  = -7.37  α1  = 0.75  R
2  = 0.44 
       (-3.1)          (2.8) 
 
(T-values are shown in parentheses). Require-
ments of normal distribution of residuals, non-
autocorrelation, homoskedasticity, and time-sta-
bility are satisfied. According to these results, 
stock biomass plays a significant role in explain-
ing CPUE. The elasticity of CPUE to biomass is 
                                                                                    
8 Alternatively, available data could be used to calculate the change 
in stock at each period, from which natural growth could be derived by 
adding observed landings. This reconstructed surplus production could 
then be regressed on X1 and X1
2 to estimate the parameters in equation 
(2). The advantage of this method is that it does not assume stock 
equilibrium. However, in the case we deal with, regressing N1 on X1 
and  X1
2 does not provide statistically significant results. This is no 
surprise, considering the strong impact of fluctuating hydroclimatic 
conditions on yearly scallop recruitment. Frésard and Boncoeur  Controlling the Biological Invasion of a Commercial Fishery by a Space Competitor   83 
 
 
not statistically different from one: the limits of 
the 95 percent confidence interval for α1 are 0.15 
and 1.35. Therefore we keep the hypothesis of 
proportionality between CPUE and biomass (α1 = 
1), which is fairly standard in fisheries literature, 
and makes analytic resolution of the model easier. 
To obtain a numerical value for the catchability 
coefficient, we estimate the following equation: 
 
(8)  11 1 tt t Z qX w =+ . 
 
The results are 
 
q1  = 7.05  R
2  = 0.39 
            (11.74) 
 
(T-value is shown in parentheses). 
  Unit prices and costs, expressed in real terms, 
are assumed to be constant over time. Their esti-
mation is based on available data for the 1990s. 
Nominal data are deflated with the help of the 
general index of consumption prices (INSEE). All 
“real” prices and costs are expressed in terms of 
constant 2003 euros. Data concerning ex-vessel 
prices are provided by auction markets (Table 1). 
According to this source, the average ex-vessel 
real price of scallops harvested in the Bay of St-
Brieuc was €2.15 per kg during the 1990–2002 
period. Deducting landing taxes (6 percent of ex-
vessel prices on the average) leads to the follow-
ing real net price of landed scallops: 
 
P1  =  €2 per kg. 
 
  Time series concerning scalloping costs in the 
Bay of St-Brieuc are not available. As a proxy, 
we use the results of a field survey (Pascoe 2000) 
providing estimations for 1997 costs in the 
French scallop fisheries of the western part of the 
English Channel (a group of fisheries where the 
Bay of St-Brieuc is by far the major component). 
Table 2 presents the estimations concerning non-
wage variable costs, by boat-length class. Ac-
cording to these estimations, the average non-
wage variable cost of dredging (expressed in 
nominal terms) was €69.44 per day and per boat 
in 1997. With a dredging time usually limited to 
50 minutes per day, this daily cost corresponds to 
€83.33 per hour and per boat on the average (in 
nominal terms). We use the legal minimum wage 
to assess the opportunity cost of labor.
9 This wage 
rate
10 (expressed in nominal terms) was €8.35 per 
hour in 1997. With an average 2.4 fishermen per 
boat, the resulting estimation for the opportunity 
cost of labor is €20.04 per fishing hour and per 
boat (in nominal terms). Adding this cost to the 
variable non-wage cost leads to an average 
€103.37 (nominal terms), or €113.10 in real terms. 
On this basis, we assume that the real overall 
variable cost of effort in the fishery is
11 
 
C1  =  €113 per hour and per boat. 
 
  Slipper-limpet (invasive species). Quantitative 
knowledge is much more limited about slipper-
limpet than about common scallop. Presence of 
the species in the Bay of St-Brieuc was first 
mentioned in 1974 (Dupouy and Latrouite 1979). 
In 1994, it covered approximately 200 km
2, i.e., 
25 percent of the whole bay area, with a biomass 
estimated at 250,000 metric tons (Hamon and 
Blanchard 1994). No stock assessment has been 
carried out since 1994, but there is evidence that 
the invasion process is ongoing (Hamon et al. 
2002). At present, slipper-limpet biomass grows 
at a rate that probably does not exceed 5 percent 
per year (Blanchard 2005). A quantitatively real-
istic population dynamics model cannot be de-
rived from this limited information. For the sake 
of numeric illustration, we assume that the bay’s 
carrying capacity for slipper-limpet is four times 
the 1994 estimated stock, i.e., 
 
K2 = 1 million tons, 
 
and that the intrinsic growth rate is 
 
r2 = 0.04, 
 
which, according to the logistic model, corresponds 
to a growth rate of 3 percent in 1994. 
  Some harvest data are available from the inva-
sion control program that was started in 1998 
                                                                                    
9 As usual in artisanal fisheries, wages of crew members (including 
the skipper) are fixed on the basis of the so-called “share system,” 
which implies a participation in profit. 
10 Including national insurance costs. 
11 Fixed costs are not taken into account, because they are not 
specific to the scalloping activity, which is only a part-time activity for 
fishermen operating in the Bay of St-Brieuc. 84    April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 2. French Scalloping Fleet of the Western English Channel: Variable Non-Wage Daily 
Dredging Costs (1997) 
Boat length class  7–10 meters  10–12 meters  12–13 meters 
Total number of boats  148  103  69 
Number of surveyed boats  9  21  14 
Daily costs (€)
a     
  Mean  42.69  78.82  111.75 
  Standard  deviation  37.65  37.65  49.24 
a Current prices. 
Source: Pascoe (2000). 
 
(Anon. 2005). After an experimental phase during 
the years 1998–2001, the program has operated 
routinely since 2002. During the period 2002–
2004, a specialized boat harvested 35,796 tons of 
slipper-limpet with a hydraulic dredge. The total 
fishing time was 375 hours, and the correspond-
ing cost was €533,715.
12 
  There are not enough available data to estimate 
statistically significant parameters of the harvest 
function [equation (4)]. Concerning the elasticity 
of CPUE to stock (parameter α2), two scenarios 
will be run in parallel: a “proportionality” sce-
nario (α2 =  1) and a “hyperdepletion” scenario 
(α2 > 1). In the latter case, we will assume, for the 
sake of numeric illustration, that (α2 = 2). Taking 
these values for parameter α2, we derive the cor-
responding values of parameter q2 from equation 
(4), in which catch and effort are set at their aver-
age value for years 2002–2004 (Y2 = 11,932 tons; 
E2 = 125 hours) and biomass at its level derived 
from the logistic model for the same period (X2 = 
321,475 tons): 
 
q2 = 2.963 × 10
 –4 
(proportionality scenario: α2 = 1) 
 
q2 = 9.237 × 10
 –10 
(hyperdepletion scenario: α2 = 2). 
 
  Harvested slipper-limpets are delivered for free 
to a processing factory, where they are rendered 
into fertilizers. In the present situation, the reve-
nue derived from this operation scarcely covers 
its cost. Therefore we will suppose 
 
P2 = 0. 
                                                                                    
12 Public subsidies covered more than 90 percent of this cost. 
Under this assumption, profit generated by har-
vesting the invasive species (π2) is always nega-
tive, and its absolute value is equal to the har-
vesting cost. Our estimation of the unit cost of 
effort is based on the control program data for 
years 2002–2004: 
 





In this section, we assume biological equilibrium 
for both stocks, i.e., that the time-variation of 
each of them is zero. Should there be no control 
program, such an equilibrium would be reached 
only when the invasive species had completely 
superseded the native stock. However, with a 
control program, the invasive stock may be stabi-
lized at a level that leaves some room for the na-
tive stock, and, as a consequence, that allows 
sustainable harvesting of this stock. 
  According to (1), the equilibrium condition 
implies that catch are equal to natural variation of 
biomass. Such catch are called “sustainable” be-
cause, under steady environmental conditions, they 
may be sustained indefinitely with a constant 
fishing effort. By introducing the equilibrium con-
dition into (1) and combining it with (2), we can 
express, for each stock, sustainable catch as a 
function of the equilibrium biomass: 
 










    (Xi ≤ Ki)  (i = 1,2). 
 
 After presenting the consequences of the 
equilibrium assumption on each stock and corre-
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For the native stock (i = 1), we consider equations 
(9) and (3), with (α1 = 1). Combining these two 
equations makes it possible to express the equilib-
rium biomass and the corresponding level of catch 
as functions of fishing effort: 
 











  (E1 ≤ q1/r1) 
 











  (E1 ≤ q1/r1). 
 
In the standard Schaefer model used here, the 
equilibrium biomass is a decreasing linear func-
tion of the steady-state level of fishing effort and, 
consequently, the corresponding level of catch is 
a quadratic concave function of fishing effort. 
The maximum level of catch in the long run, or 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY), is equal to 
(r1.K1 / 4), and the corresponding levels of equi-
librium biomass and effort are respectively (K1 / 2) 
and (r1 / 2.q1). If, in the long run, fishing effort 
exceeds the level corresponding to MSY, sustain-
able catch becomes a decreasing function of ef-
fort (overfishing). Equilibrium biomass and catch 
go to zero if effort remains above (r1 / q1). 
  Equations (10) and (11) depend on the level of 
the carrying capacity of the ecosystem for the na-
tive stock, which, according to equation (4), is 
negatively influenced by the presence of the inva-
sive species. The impact of the invasion on (10) 
and (11) is illustrated in Figure 1. 
  Steady-state profit may be expressed as a func-
tion of fishing effort by combining (5) and (10): 
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  (E1 ≤ q1/r1). 
 
According to this relationship, profit cannot be 
positive in the long run if the carrying capacity 
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If K1 exceeds this break-even capacity, the long-
run maximum profit is 
 
(14)      
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Because (14) is an increasing function of K1, 
long-run maximum profit is negatively influenced 




In the case of stock 2, we have equilibrium rela-
tionships between fishing effort, biomass, and 
catch by combining equations (9) and (3). These 
relationships depend on the value of parameter α2, 
which is the elasticity of CPUE to stock biomass. 
  If this parameter is equal to one (the “propor-
tionality” scenario), the equilibrium relationships 
between E2, X2, and Y2 are similar to the equilib-
rium relationships between E1, X1, and Y1 (Figure 
2, proportionality scenario). In this case, complete 
eradication of the invasive stock is technically 
feasible, by setting fishing effort at (r2/q2). 
However, this is not a steady-state effort level: 
once complete eradication has been achieved, the 
invasive species harvesting effort falls to zero. 
  In the more general case where (α2 ∈ [0,∞[), 
the equilibrium relationship between E2 and X2 is 
written as 
 











   ( X2 ≤ K2). 
 
 If  α2 is greater than one (the “hyperdepletion” 
scenario), it is not always possible to express 
analytically X2, and hence Y2, in terms of E2. How-
ever, it appears from (15) that, for any X2 between 
zero and K2,  E2 is a positive, differentiable, 
strictly decreasing, and convex function of X2. 86    April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
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Figure 1. Impact of Invasion on Native Species Equilibrium Biomass and Catch, as Functions of 
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lim Y2 = 0
E2 → + ∞
 
 
Figure 2. Relation Between Invasive Species Fishing Effort, Biomass, and Catch 
 
Therefore, the reciprocal function X2(E2) is defined 
as differentiable, positive, strictly decreasing, and 
convex for any non-negative level of effort.
13 It is 
equal to K2 when (E2 = 0), and has a zero asymp-
totic limit as E2 increases indefinitely (Figure 2, 
hyperdepletion scenario). This result indicates that 
                                                                                    
13 A similar result would be obtained with a variant of the simple lo-
gistic model, where 
 
 N 2 = r2X2 (1 – (X2 / K2)
θ ), 
 
provided θ is less than 1. Assuming θ < 1 would imply greater ongoing 
control costs to contain the invasive stock than would assuming θ = 1. 
While the implication of θ < 1 on the relationship between steady-state 
biomass and harvesting effort is similar to the implication of hyperde-
pletion (α2 > 1), the mechanism of action is a consequence of changes 
in the population growth rate rather than changes in catchability. In the 
case under survey, it is not possible to decide, on the basis of currently 
available information, which mechanism squares better with the facts. 
total eradication of the invasive stock is impossi-
ble in the hyperdepletion case. 
  The level of sustainable catch Y2 is a function 
of the equilibrium biomass X2 [equation (11)], 
itself a function of effort E2 for any (α2 ≥ 1). Con-
sequently, Y2 may also be considered as a func-
tion of E2: 
(16)  22 222 () [() ] YE YXE = . 
The properties of this composed function may be 
derived from the properties of the component func-
tions  Y2(X2) and X2(E2). The function Y2(E2) is 
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When E2 is set at this level, Y2(E2) is maximum 
(MSY) and equal to (r2.K2 / 4). It becomes a de-
creasing function when E2 goes beyond this point. 
In the case where α2 is greater than one (hyper-
depletion),  Y2(E2) tends asymptotically towards 
zero as E2 increases indefinitely (Figure 2, hyper-
depletion scenario). 
 
Control Program and Social Cost of Invasion 
 
We now consider the optimal program for con-
trolling the population of the invasive species, 
assuming biological equilibrium conditions. The 
native species fishery is supposed to be managed 
optimally, with fishing effort set at its long-run 
profit-maximizing level (E1*). This level depends 
on the carrying capacity of the ecosystem for the 
native stock (K1), and, consequently, on the equi-
librium level of the invasive stock biomass (X2). 
If the invasive stock is not harvested, its biomass 
will reach equilibrium when the ecosystem is fully 
invaded (X2 = K2), which implies that (K1 = 0) and 
(E1* = 0). Therefore, the problem is to determine 
the optimum level of invasive species biomass 
control, i.e., the one that maximizes the overall 
long-run surplus of the control program. This 




12 π=π +π . 
 
With a zero-price for invasive species, π2 is nec-
essarily non-positive, and its absolute value is 
simply the cost of harvesting this species. Both 
this cost and the optimal profit of the native spe-
cies fishery (π1*) will be expressed hereafter in 
terms of invasive species equilibrium biomass (X2). 
 As  regards  π1*, this operation is achieved by 
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the level of invasive species biomass bringing the 
carrying capacity of the ecosystem for the native 
species down to the point where optimal profit in 
the native fishery is zero, i.e., such that 
 
   22 22 . X XK K =⇒=   
 
As long as X2 is below this level, function π1*(X2) 
is strictly positive, decreasing, and convex. Its ex-
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  Expressing the cost of harvesting the invasive 
species in terms of X2 requires multiplying both 
sides of (15) by C2, which is the unit cost of effort 
devoted to this activity: 
 
(22)    
2 1 22 2











         22 (1 ) ( ) X K α ≥≤ . 
 
Due to the negative relation between equilibrium 
biomass and harvesting effort, ⎜π2 ⎜is a decreas-
ing function of X2 . It is equal to zero when (X2 = 
K2), i.e., when the invasive species is not har-
vested. In the proportionality case (α2 = 1), the 
relation between ⎜π2 ⎜ and X2 is linear, and the cost 
of eradicating stock 2 is equal to (C2.r2 / q2) (how-
ever, this is not a permanent cost: once full eradi-
cation has been achieved, the invasive species 
harvesting cost becomes zero). In the hyperde-
pletion case (α2 >  1), the relation between ⎜π2 ⎜ 
and X2 is strictly convex, and the cost of harvest-
ing stock 2 tends to be infinite as the equilibrium 
value of this stock gets close to zero (eradication 
is impossible in this case). 
  By combining (17), (18), and (22), we may ex-
press the global surplus of the control program, 
assuming biological equilibrium, as a function of 
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In Figure 3, this surplus is visualized as the verti-
cal distance between the two curves representing 
respectively π1*(X2) and ⎜π2(X2)⎜. 
  Making the control program profitable requires 
the existence of some level of invasive species 
biomass,  2 ˆ , X  such that 
 
(24)      22 ˆ 0 X X ≤<    and  
*
12 22 ˆˆ () () X X π= π . 
 
  In the proportionality case (Figure 3, propor-
tionality scenario), this requirement corresponds 











If this condition holds, the intersection between 
the two curves is unique, and represents the break-
even point of the program (not to be confused 
with the break-even point of the native species 
fishery, which does not take into account the in-
vasive species harvesting cost): 
 
(26)  22 ˆ 0 XX <⇔ π > . 
 
When X2 is kept below that point, the distance be-
tween the convex curve representing π1*(X2) and 
the straight line representing ⎜π2(X2)⎜ increases as 
X2 gets closer to zero. As a result, the optimal pro-
gram follows an “all or none” rule, corresponding 
either to complete laissez-faire (27a) or to com-
plete invasive species eradication (27b): 
 
(27a)      
** 22
1max 2 2 2
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In the first case, the corollary of the laissez-faire 
attitude towards invasion is the complete extinc-
tion of the native species fishery.  
  This dilemma between complete invasive stock 
eradication and extinction of the native species 
fishery is a consequence of the proportionality 
assumption. Assuming hyperdepletion makes com-
plete invasive species eradication impossible, and 
makes room for an intermediate optimal level of 
control scenario. 
  With an elasticity of CPUE to stock larger than 
one, the harvesting cost curve for the invasive 
species is strictly convex (Figure 3, hyperdeple-
tion scenario). In this case, the intersection be-
tween this curve and the one representing π1*(X2), 
if it exists, usually is not unique. In Figure 3’s de-
piction of this scenario, there are two positive 
levels of invasive species stock biomass: 
 
   2 ˆ
a X  and  22 ˆˆ
ba X X > , 
 
satisfying condition (24). The global surplus of 
the program is positive between these levels, and 
negative outside them: 
 
(28)  22 2 ˆˆ 0 ab XX X < <⇔ π > . 
 
The optimal program for controlling the invasive 
stock corresponds to a stabilized biomass level 
X2* such that 
 
(29)      
*
22 2 ˆˆ











i.e., the marginal benefit of decreasing invasive 
stock for the native species fishery is balanced by 
the marginal harvesting cost of this decrease. 
  Following Knowler and Barbier (2000), we 
may assess the social cost of the invasion as the 
difference between the optimal equilibrium profit 
of the uninvaded native species fishery and the 
equilibrium optimal net benefit of the invasive 
species control program: 
 
(30)       
*
1max * inv SC =− π π . 
 
If condition (24) does not hold, it is not possible 
to make the control program profitable under 
equilibrium conditions. The social cost of the 
invasion is then equal, in absolute value, to the 
optimal equilibrium profit of the uninvaded native 
species fishery. It is lower if condition (24) holds, 
because then sustainability of the native species 
fishery may be reconciled with the presence of 
the invasive species by means of a socially profit-
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|π2|| π2|
Figure 3. Net Benefit of the Invasive Species Control Program, as a Function of the Stabilized 
Invasive Biomass 
 
  In order to give a quantitative illustration of the 
equilibrium analysis, we present in Table 3 the 
equilibrium values based on the numeric illustra-
tion of the model presented in the first section of 
the paper. Results show that, under the propor-
tionality scenario, the optimal eradication solution 
generates a greater net benefit (€17 million) than 
the optimal level of stabilized invasive stock 
biomass of the hyperdepletion scenario (€15 mil-
lion). But the comparability of these figures is 
limited by the fact that the equilibrium surplus of 
the proportionality scenario does not include the 
eradication cost, which is not permanent. In the 
case of hyperdepletion, the social cost of inva-
sion, computed according to equation (28), would 
be €2 million, instead of €17 million if the control 
program was not carried out. 
  Sensitivity tests were carried out on two highly 
uncertain parameters of the invasive species dy-
namics: present growth rate of the stock and car-
rying capacity of the ecosystem. Table 4 displays 
the impact of these tests on the social cost of in-
vasion, assuming hyperdepletion. Concerning the 
present growth rate of the slipper-limpet stock, 
two scenarios have been run: 1 percent and 5 per-
cent. According to the results of the sensitivity 
tests, the social cost of invasion increases with the 
value of the present estimated growth rate of the 
invasive stock, and is more than two times greater 
in the 5 percent scenario than in the 1 percent 
scenario. Two scenarios have also been run con-
cerning the carrying capacity for slipper-limpets: 
625,000 tons (i.e., 2.5 times the 1994 estimated 
stock biomass), and 2.5 million tons (10 times the 
1994 estimated stock biomass). According to 
tests, the social cost of invasion is a decreasing 
function of the carrying capacity of the ecosystem 
for the invasive stock, and its value is divided by 
approximately 2.4 when the carrying capacity 





In this section, we analyze the invasive species 
control program which is now being implemented 
in the Bay of St-Brieuc common scallop fishery 
(Anon. 2005). For this purpose, we use the bio-
economic model that was presented in the first 
part of the paper, but we drop the assumptions of 
steady-state and optimal management of the 
fishery. 
  Steady-state analysis neglects transition costs. 
Even though a certain type of long-run equilib-
rium may be regarded as desirable, reaching this 
position is usually expensive and time-consum-
ing, and this type of consideration has to be taken 
into account in a cost-benefit analysis. 
  As regards fisheries management, despite the 
fact that nominal effort is controlled and a total 
allowed catch (TAC) is fixed each year, no em-
pirical evidence suggests that the management of 
the Bay of St-Brieuc common scallop fishery is 
ruled by economic optimization (Fifas, Guyader, Frésard and Boncoeur  Controlling the Biological Invasion of a Commercial Fishery by a Space Competitor   91 
 
 
Table 3. Equilibrium Analysis: Numerical Simulation Under Two Scenarios Concerning the 
Invasive Species Harvest Function: Proportionality (α2 = 1) and Hyperdepletion (α2 = 2) 
IS harvesting cost
b Net  benefit
b 









b  α2 = 1  α2 = 2  α2 = 1  α2 = 2 
No invasion
c   0    54,252   17,099   0    0   17,099   17,099 
Program lower break-even (α2 = 2)    3,604    54,056   17,036   191    17,036    16,845    0 
Optimum (α2 = 2)   59,200    51,040   16,057   180    979    15,876   15,078 
Program break-even (α2 = 1)    983,520    894   3   3    1    0    2 
Program upper break-even (α2 = 2)    984,305    851   1   3    1    -2    0 
NS fishery break-even   985,220    802    0    3    1    -3    -1 
Full invasion   10
6    0   0   0    0   0   0 
a In tons. 
b In 1,000 euros. 
c And optimum when (α2 = 1). In this case the invasive species harvesting cost is not permanent, and does not appear in the 
equilibrium data. 
Notes: IS = invasive species, NS = native species. 
 
 
Table 4. Equilibrium Analysis: Social Cost of Invasion Under Hyperdepletion Scenario
a 
(in 1,000 euros) 
Invasive species carrying capacity
b    625   1,000   2,500 
Present invasive species growth rate             
  1  %   1,676   1,167      684 
  3  %   2,823   2,021   1,181 
  5  %   3,592   2,593   1,524 
a Difference between optimal profit of the uninvaded native species fishery and optimal net benefit of the invasive species control 
program (equilibrium values). 
b In 1,000 tons. 
 
 
and Boucher 2003). Annual authorized fishing 
time is not correlated to the variations of harvest-
able biomass, and, during years 1990 to 2003, 
actual (declared) catch have exceeded scientific 
recommendations by 22 percent on the average 
(Fifas 2004). The results of the model presented 
in the first part of this paper suggest that overfish-
ing is the rule, and the apparently high profitabil-
ity of the fishery is not at odds with this diagno-
sis: as scalloping in the bay is only a part-time 
activity for fishermen and fishing boats, only di-
rect (specific) costs are taken into account when 
computing the gross margin generated by this ac-
tivity. These considerations suggest an approach 
of the invasive species control program in terms 
of dynamic simulation, rather than static optimi-
zation. 
  The strategy of this program relies on a distinc-
tion between two stages, which might be called 
“rollback” and “containment”: the first one is 
characterized by a high level of invasive species 
harvesting, in order to decrease significantly the 
level of invasion; the second step is intended to 
consolidate the outcome of the “rollback” phase, 
by harvesting each year the natural surplus pro-
duced by the existing biomass. 
  In the case of the St-Brieuc fishery, the first 
stage of the program consists of harvesting 
100,000 tons of slipper-limpet over five years 
(according to our model, this represents two times 
the MSY, estimated at 10,000 tons a year). This 
stage has started in 2002. For external reasons 
(limited availability of the boat used for the har-
vest), the level of harvest during the two first 92    April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
years (9,034 tons in 2002, 8,681 tons in 2003) has 
lagged far behind the targeted level, but a sharp 
increase was realized in 2004 (18,081 tons), and 
the program is now operated in the vicinity of 
what was initially planned. In our analysis, we 
will neglect the gap between initial plans and 
implementation, and assume that 20,000 tons of 
slipper-limpet are actually harvested each year 
during five years. 
  The second stage of the program (“contain-
ment”) is not yet precisely scheduled, which may 
be explained by the uncertainty concerning the 
dynamics of the invasive species: the annual level 
of harvest in this stage depends on the speed at 
which cleaned areas are recolonized, a parameter 
which is not yet well known. Our simulation of 
this stage will rely on the simple logistic model 
presented in the first part of the paper, associated 
with the two variants of the harvest function 
(proportional CPUE and hyperdepletion). 
  To simulate the impact of the program on the 
scallop fishery, we will assume that fishing effort 
is exogenous: as long as the gross margin gener-
ated by the fishery is positive, the annual fishing 
time is kept equal to the average level observed 
during years 1990–2001 (approximately 7,500 
hours per year). This is probably an oversimplifi-
cation, but it is intended to reflect in a stylized 
way the evidence that effort management is 
hardly influenced by resource abundance. An-
other simplification concerning fishing effort is 
the fact that no provision is made for the increase 
in the catchability coefficient due to technical 
progress. 
  For the sake of dynamic simulations, we use a 
discrete-time version of the continuous-time 
model presented in the first part of the paper. As 
regards initial conditions (with year 1 being the 
first year of program implementation), we sup-
pose that the slipper-limpet biomass is 250,000 
tons (corresponding to the 1994 stock assess-
ment), and that the scallop biomass is 7,611 tons 
(corresponding to the average of the years 1990–
2001). The time discount rate is set to 5 percent (a 
sensitivity test will be presented below concern-
ing this assumption). As above, unit prices and 
costs are exogenous, the ex-vessel price of slip-
per-limpets is assumed to be zero, and the cost of 
processing equals the revenue generated by this 
activity. 
  We first investigate the impact of the program 
on biomass and catch of each species. Then we 
analyze the economic results of the program, 
taking into account both the cost of invasive spe-
cies harvesting and the resulting benefits for the 
scallop fishery. Finally, we investigate variants 
concerning the starting date of the program, and 
we present results of sensitivity tests. At each 
step, in a cost-benefit perspective, we compare 
the simulated results of the program with a “no 
control,” or laissez-faire scenario. 
 
Impact of the Control Program on Invasive and 
Native Stock Dynamics 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the consequences of the con-
trol program on the dynamics of the invasive spe-
cies. The two steps of the program appear on this 
figure: the harvest is set exogenously at 20,000 
tons per year during the “rollback” stage, and 
during the following “containment” stage, it is set 
at a level that balances the natural growth of the 
invasive stock biomass, in order to stabilize this 
biomass. According to the model, this permanent 
level of harvest is slightly over 6,000 tons per 
year, i.e., 30 percent of the annual harvest during 
the “rollback” stage. As a result, the invasive spe-
cies biomass, which was assumed to be 250,000 
tons at the beginning of the program, falls to 
184,750 tons at the end of the “rollback” stage 
(74 percent of the pre-program level), and is sta-
bilized at this level during the second stage of the 
program. In the laissez-faire scenario, the inva-
sive stock biomass increases steadily, and, ac-
cording to the specification of the logistic model 
used in the simulation, it more than doubles 
within 3 decades, reaching 500,000 tons during 
year 29 (2.7 times the stabilized biomass of the 
invasive species control scenario). 
  The consequences of the program on the scal-
lop fishery are displayed in Figure 5. With no 
control, the bay’s carrying capacity for scallops 
would decline steadily due to increasing competi-
tion by the invasive species (approximately by 
one-third within three decades) as would annual 
catch, with a time lag due to the permanent dis-
equilibrium generated in the fishery by the de-
clining carrying capacity. 
  Contrasting with this negative trend, the control 
program results in stabilizing both carrying ca-
















Figure 4. Impact of the Invasive Species Control Program on the Dynamics of the Invasive 
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Note: IS = invasive species. 
Figure 5. Impact of the Invasive Species Control Program on the Native Species Fishery (t1 = 100) 
 
these variables are respectively 66 percent and 44 
percent higher with invasive species control than 
without control, and the gap continuously widens 
with time. Due to the “rollback” first step of the 
program, the stabilized values of scallop carrying 
capacity and catch are also higher than the imme-
diate pre-program corresponding values. But, ac-
cording to the simulation, the difference is less 
than 10 percent. 
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Economic Results of the Control Program 
 
Figure 6 summarizes the economic results of the 
program, in annual (undiscounted) terms. The 
fishery annual gross margin, which decreases to 
zero in the laissez-faire scenario, would naturally 
benefit from the stabilization of environmental 
conditions generated by the program. The overall 
benefit of the program takes into account both its 
impact on the profitability of the scallop fishery 
and the slipper-limpet harvesting cost. This cost 
depends on the quantity harvested, but also on 
stock abundance and harvesting technical condi-
tions (nature of the relation between CPUE and 
stock biomass). As in the first part of the paper, 
we consider two variants of the harvest function: 
proportionality between CPUE and biomass, and 
hyperdepletion. 
  Invasive species harvesting costs are higher in 
the “hyperdepletion” than in the “proportional” 
variant because the decrease in CPUE resulting 
from the lower abundance of slipper-limpet is 
more significant in the first case. Therefore, as-
suming hyperdepletion makes the annual overall 
benefit of the program less favorable than as-
suming proportionality between CPUE and stock 
biomass. But this difference is far from critical. In 
both variants, the overall annual benefit of the 
program is always positive, even during the “roll-
back” stage where slipper-limpet harvesting is 
high. This is due to the fact that slipper-limpet 
harvesting costs represent but a small proportion 
of the gross margin generated by the scallop fish-
ery (always under 15 percent). 
  Compared to the laissez-faire scenario, both 
variants of the control scenario lead to a lower 
economic performance during the 4 first years, i.e., 
during the major part of the “rollback” stage of the 
program. However, the comparison favors the 
control scenario at the end of this stage. The 
superiority of control over laissez-faire increases 
steadily with time, due to the improving perform-
ance of the control scenario, but due even more to 
the continuously deteriorating economic perform-
ance of the fishery under the laissez-faire scenario. 
  The discounted present values of both scenar-
ios are displayed in Table 5. According to the 
simulation, the control program generates a cu-
mulated global present value which is greater by 
approximately 25 percent than the laissez-faire 
scenario, whatever the variant considered for the 
invasive species harvest function. Moreover, in-
vasive species control allows sustainable fishing, 
while the laissez-faire scenario implies non-sus-
tainability: because of declining carrying capacity 
of the invaded ecosystem for the native resource, 
native species fishing would stop after 96 years 
under this scenario. The length of this period is 
explained by two considerations: the intrinsic 
growth rate of the invasive stock which is as-
sumed in the model to be relatively low, and the 
initial gross margin generated by scalloping, 
which is high. However, neither consideration 
should be regarded as providing solid ground for 
a “benign neglect” attitude towards the invasive 
process. 
 
The Question of the Starting Date of the Program 
 
In the described control scenario, the starting date 
of the program was set exogenously, and the only 
alternative considered was whether the program 
should be implemented or not. But slightly more 
sophisticated choices may be considered, includ-
ing the question of the starting date of the pro-
gram. Postponing this date is not neutral, for two 
distinct but interacting reasons: (i) the level of 
invasion which is to be addressed by the program 
is time-dependent, and (ii) the discounted present 
value of a set of cash flows depends on their 
time-pattern. 
  Basically, delaying the starting date of the pro-
gram has opposite consequences on the profit-
ability of the fishery and on the cost of the pro-
gram. 
  It is clearly undesirable from the fishermen’s 
point of view, both in the short run and in the 
long run: in the short run, postponing the control 
of the invasive process immediately deteriorates 
the environmental conditions of their activity, and 
in the long run, the level of the stabilized ecosys-
tem carrying capacity for their target species is 
negatively influenced by the level of invasion 
reached at the starting date of the program. More-
over, delaying the benefits generated by the pro-
gram decreases their discounted present value. 
  As regards the invasive species harvesting cost, 
it is also useful to distinguish short-run and long-
run effects. In the short run, letting the invasion 
progress before the program starts results in 
higher CPUEs (especially in the case of hyperde-
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Notes: IS = invasive species, CPUE = catch per unit of effort. 




Table 5. Cumulated Time-Discounted Economic Results of Invasive Species Control and Laissez-
Faire Scenarios (in million euros, infinite time horizon, time-discount rate 5 percent) 
   Control  scenario 
  Laissez-faire scenario “Proportional”  variant “Hyperdepletion”  variant 
Native species fishery gross margin    116.9    152.4    152.4 
Invasive species harvesting cost    0    4.3    6.9 




of the “rollback” stage of the program. In the long 
run, the higher the stabilized biomass, the lower 
the corresponding permanent level of harvesting 
effort will be. Therefore, postponing the starting 
date of the program also reduces harvesting costs 
during the “containment” stage of the program, 
because it results in a higher biomass at the end 
of the former stage. Moreover, delaying the costs 
of the program decreases their discounted present 
value, ceteris paribus. 
  To illustrate these various effects, four scenar-
ios have been simulated. The first one corre-
sponds to the immediate starting of the program. 
In scenarios 2, 3, and 4, the starting date of the 
program is delayed by 5, 10, and 15 years, re-
spectively. 
  According to simulation results, as the starting 
date of the program is delayed, the period of in-
creasing invasive species biomass gets longer, 
and the stabilized level of controlled biomass gets 
higher. A higher level of invasive species bio-
mass implies a lower level of carrying capacity 
for the native species, and, hence, lower catch and 
lower profits for a given level of fishing effort. 
  As delaying the starting date of the control pro-
gram implies a higher level of invasive species 
biomass at the beginning of the “rollback” stage, 
it helps to decrease the cost of this stage because 96    April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
CPUE is higher with stock abundance (particu-
larly in the case of hyperdepletion). It also im-
plies a higher level of invasive species biomass at 
the end of the “rollback” stage, and hence, as long 
as the MSY point is not reached, a higher perma-
nent level of harvest to be realized during the 
“containment” stage. However, due to the in-
crease in CPUE, this harvest is realized at a lower 
cost, particularly in the case of hyperdepletion. 
This permanent cost effect during the “contain-
ment” stage of the program adds up to the tempo-
rary one during the “rollback” stage. As a conse-
quence, delaying the starting date of the program 
helps in reducing its cost. 
  Due to the difference of scale between the fish-
ery gross margin and the operating cost of the 
control program, delaying the starting date of this 
program has negative long-term consequences on 
its annual net surplus: the positive impact on the 
invasive species harvesting cost is overbalanced 
by the negative impact on the fishery profitability. 
However, the consequences are not so simple 
during the transition period, where implementing 
the program involves extra costs. As a conse-
quence, the ranking of the different scenarios on 
the basis of their economic performance may vary 
according to the time-discount rate, as illustrated 




Sensitivity tests were carried out on three pa-
rameters: the time discount rate, the invasive spe-
cies growth rate, and the carrying capacity of the 
ecosystem for the invasive species. 
  As regards the first parameter, the results of the 
tests indicate that immediate implementation of 
the control program (scenario 1) is the best alter-
native as long as the time discount rate is less 
than 15 percent in the hyperdepletion case, and 16 
percent in the proportionality case. When this 
level is reached, postponing the program by 5 
years (scenario 2) is a better solution.
14 
                                                                                    
14 In the case (corresponding to the actual situation) where the 
“rollback” stage of the program has been implemented, the question of 
the starting date of the program is replaced by the question of the 
starting date of its containment stage. In this case, sensitivity tests 
indicate that it is worthwhile postponing the containment stage of the 
program during 5 years if the time discount rate reaches 15 percent 
(hyperdepletion) or 16 percent (proportionality). 
  Changing the value of the estimated present 
growth rate of the invasive stock from 1 percent 
to 5 percent (ceteris paribus) lowers the dis-
counted benefit of the control program. But it 
lowers the discounted value of the laissez-faire 
scenario even more, and as a result, immediate 
implementation of the control program is still the 
best alternative. 
  Changing the carrying capacity of the ecosys-
tem for slipper-limpets from 625,000 tons to 2.5 
million tons (ceteris paribus) increases the dis-
counted values of both control and laissez-faire 
scenarios, though at a higher rate for the second 
one. However, immediate implementation of the 
control program is still the best alternative with a 





Making use of a simple two-species bioeconomic 
model, this paper has surveyed the economic con-
sequences of the biological invasion of a com-
mercial fishery by an exotic species acting as a 
space competitor for the native targeted species. 
For each stock, the model relies on the classical 
Schaefer assumptions, with a variant for the inva-
sive stock, allowing for so-called “hyperdeple-
tion” in the harvest function. The dynamics of the 
native stock is linked to that of the invasive stock 
by an asymmetric competition relation, where the 
carrying capacity of the ecosystem for the native 
species is a decreasing function of the level of 
invasion of the fishery by the invasive species. 
The equilibrium study performed with this model 
has underscored the importance of assuming hy-
perdepletion in the invasive species harvest func-
tion. Contrasted with the standard assumption of 
proportionality between CPUE and stock abun-
dance, the hyperdepletion assumption makes it 
possible to model the irreversible character of the 
invasion. In the hyperdepletion case, an “optimal 
rate of invasion” may be found, differing from the 
“all or none” control that characterizes the pro-
portionality assumption. The dynamic simulations 
realized with the help of the model have empha-
sized the importance of time when assessing the 
results of a control program. 
  The model was qualitatively based on a case 
study of the Bay of St-Brieuc common scallop 
fishery, facing biological invasion by slipper-lim-Frésard and Boncoeur  Controlling the Biological Invasion of a Commercial Fishery by a Space Competitor   97 
 
 
pet. Its numerical illustration relies on the avail-
able biological and economic knowledge of this 
case. However, this model faces several important 
limits. Some are due to the deficiency of biologi-
cal knowledge, especially in the field of slipper-
limpet dynamics. Other limits are due to the mod-
eling assumptions. In particular, describing the 
common scallop dynamics by means of a global 
deterministic model is open to criticism, due to 
the high variability of recruitment of this species. 
Considering prices and native species fishing 
effort (in the dynamic simulations) as exogenous 
variables is certainly another significant limitation 
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